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Abstract. The present article sets out to examine the right of access under
Directive 2016/680, which regulates the processing of personal data by EU
Member States’ law enforcement authorities. The article analyses in detail the
provisions on the right of access. More precisely, it looks at whether the right
provides for suf!cient transparency towards the data subject and whether its
scope allows for a harmonized data protection across the law enforcement sector
in the EU. The article concludes that while the provisions on the right of access
make a signi!cant step towards more transparency, they also suffer from de!-
ciencies. Also, the limited scope of the Directive takes away from the harmo-
nization attempts.
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1 Introduction
The right of access to one’s personal data plays an important role in allowing data
subjects to exercise control over the processing of their data [1]. Its signi!cance is
evidenced by its explicit inclusion as a constitutive element of the fundamental right to
data protection in Article 8 (2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(CFREU) [2] and by its presence in every instrument on data protection in Europe, e.g.
Article 12 (a) Directive 95/46/EC [3], Article 15 General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [4], as well as Council of Europe instruments [5].
Despite the lack of a comprehensive data protection framework in the law-
enforcement sector in the EU until the entry into force of Directive 2016/680 [6], the
right of access to one’s own data has been provided for in different Area of Freedom
Security and Justice (AFSJ) instruments, e.g. Article 17 2008 Framework Decision [7],
which is about to be replaced by Directive 2016/680.1 The said Directive is supposed to
improve the protection of data subjects’ personal data in the law enforcement sector,
1 Article 59 Directive 2016/680.
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not least because it expands the scope of application of the 2008 Framework Decision.2
Thus, it will be applicable not only to the exchange of personal data between the
competent Member State law-enforcement authorities but to the entire cycle of pro-
cessing of personal data by them. As a result, data subjects may exercise their rights,
e.g. the right of access, as regards all law enforcement data processing operations,
subject to the limitations provided for in Directive 2016/680.
Further, by replacing the 2008 Framework Decision, Directive 2016/680 would be
applicable to the already existing AFSJ instruments, to which the 2008 Framework
Decision used to apply, such as SIS II Council Decision [8],3 PNR [9],4 and the
instruments regulating the Member State law enforcement authorities’ access to VIS
[10]5 and to EURODAC [11].6 These instruments themselves, except the EU PNR
Directive, contain substantive and procedural rules on the rights of data subjects, e.g.
the right of access. These more speci!c provisions leave Member States a certain
margin of appreciation, e.g. as to the procedures for allowing data subjects to exercise
their rights and as to the limitations to these rights.7 Thus, at the time of the entry into
force of Directive 2016/680 the patchwork of provisions on the right of access in the
law-enforcement sector remains.
This situation gives rise, amongst others, to two questions. First, would the right of
access in Directive 2016/680 allow data subjects to exercise their right of access in the
law enforcement sector effectively? Second, does Directive 2016/680 bring about a
harmonized and consistent application of the right of access in the law enforcement
sector?
To answer these questions, the following Sect. 2 will examine the legal sources of
the right of access in Europe, while Sect. 3 will examine the signi!cance of that right.
Section 4 will introduce the scope of the right of access under Directive 2016/680,
followed by Sect. 5 on the information which the controller has to provide under that
provision. Section 6 will examine the limitations of the right of access under Directive
2016/680. Next, Sect. 7 will focus on the procedural issues related to the exercise of the
right of access. Last but not least, Sect. 8 will discuss in how far the right of access
under Directive 2016/680 harmonizes the provisions on that right across the law-
enforcement authorities in Europe.
2 Legal Sources of the Right of Access
In Europe, the right of access is one of the subjective rights granted to data subjects in
several legal instruments. As mentioned above, the right is enshrined in Article 8
CFREU. It is further to be found in Article 8 (b) of Council of Europe Convention 108,
2 Compare Article 2 Directive 2016/680 and Article 1 2008 Framework Decision.
3 Recital 21 Council Decision SIS II.
4 Article 13 (1) EU PNR Directive.
5 Recital 9 VIS Council Decision.
6 Recital 39 EURODAC Regulation.
7 E.g. Article 58 Council Decision SIS II.
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pursuant to which any person shall have the right to “obtain at reasonable intervals and
without excessive delay or expense con!rmation of whether personal data relating to
him are stored in the automated data !le as well as communication to him of such data
in an intelligible form.” [12]8 The provision on the right of access as enshrined in
Article 12 (a) Directive 95/46/EC is similar. In addition to the requirements in Con-
vention 108, it requires the controller to provide the requesting data subject a minimum
set of detailed information about the processing of the data subject’s personal data.
Article 15 GDPR will replace Article 12 (a) Directive 95/46/EC and expand its scope.
Article 15 GDPR applies in the framework of data processing by private and public
actors which are not law enforcement or security authorities. It would require data
controllers to con!rm to the data subject whether they process personal data relating to
him and provide him information concerning the processing of his data. The obligatory
information pieces are more as compared to Directive 95/46/EC, e.g. as to the envis-
aged storage period, sources of the data and safeguards used for international transfers.
In addition, the data subject has the right to one copy of his data free of charge.
As to the ECHR, Article 8 ECHR on the right to private and family life does not
explicitly provide for a subjective right of access to one’s data as such. However, in its
case-law the ECtHR has tackled the topic of access to one’s personal data as an
essential part of one’s enjoyment of his private and family life, e.g. obtaining details
about one’s past [13],9 or as part of ensuring the legal processing of one’s data, e.g. by
the law enforcement authorities [14].10 Also, it has assessed under Article 13 ECHR on
effective remedies whether on a procedural level access to one’s data or at least
opportunities for independent supervision and review were provided for [15, 16].11
As to the police sector, the right of access to one’s data has been enshrined since
1987 in Principle 6.2 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommen-
dation Nr. R (87) 15. It provides for the right of every data subject to have access to a
police !le, which is understood to mean a police !le containing data concerning the
particular data subject, at regular intervals and without excessive delay, in accordance
with domestic law [5].
Following the recent legislative developments concerning data protection in the
police sector, the right of access “at reasonable intervals, without constraint and
without excessive delay or expense” in Article 17 2008 Framework Decision will be
replaced by Article 14 Directive 2016/680. Its provisions and implications will be
analyzed in Sect. 5.
8 Article 8 (b) Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, 28.01.1981.
9 ECtHR, Gaskin v the United Kingdom, Application no. 10454/83, 07. 07. 1989. In casu, obtaining
information about claimed abuse while in foster care.
10 ECtHR, Khelili v Switzerland, Application no 16188/07, 18 October 2011 (discussed below).
11 ECtHR, Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 62332/00, 6.06.2006; ECtHR,
Amann v Switzerland, Application no. 27798/95, 16 February 2000.
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3 Four Main Purposes of the Right of Access
As mentioned in the introduction, the right of access is a tool which enables data
subjects to exercise control over their data. This broad purpose could be broken down
into four more concrete purposes. These are: (1) transparency, (2) supervision of
legality of the personal data processing and an enabler of the exercise of the other data
protection rights, (3) monitoring the execution of the corrective measures, and
(4) raising awareness about practices that impact a large number of data subjects, thus
triggering changes. The purposes were derived from case-law and academic literature
and complied in the present section.
First, in Rijkeboer, the Advocate General (AG) argued that the purpose of the right
of access is to give data subjects transparency by ensuring that they are aware of the
information stored on them [17].12 One could add that by enhancing transparency, the
right of access contributes to the achievement of informational balance between the
data subject and the controllers, which is especially important in the law-enforcement
sector where the nature of the work involves more secrecy than other sectors.
Second, the knowledge of the personal information stored and the related details
allows the data subject to “supervise” whether the processing of his data is lawful and
react to illegalities in the processing. Thus, the right of access is “a means for a data
subject to oversee and enforce observance of the law,” especially the principles of data
protection, in casu those enshrined in Article 6 Directive 95/46/EC such as fairness and
lawfulness, purpose limitation, data accuracy, data minimization and limited storage
period.13
In that respect it is argued that the right of access is a pre-requisite and enabler
for the exercise of the remaining informational rights, “the gatekeeper enabling data
subjects to take further action.” [14, 18].14 For the data subject to exercise the other
rights – to recti!cation, erasure, restriction of processing, objection, the right not to be
subject to automated individual decision-making such as pro!ling, and under the
GDPR also data portability15 – he !rst has to be aware that a certain controller is
processing his data and obtain further information related to that processing. Although
the data controller is obliged to provide the said information under his information
obligations,16 the two rights are not the same or mutually exclusive. The right of access
12 CJEU, C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v M.E. E. Rijkeboer,
7.05.2009 (Hereinafter “Rijkeboer”), Opinion of the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,
22.12.2008, par. 33 and 34. In Rijkeboer, the applicant requested the College van burgemeester en
wethouders van Rotterdam to inform him of the recipients to which it had transferred data relating to
him, especially his address, in the two years preceding the request. The College provided the
requested information only as regards the disclosure of the data one year prior to the request, the rest
was automatically deleted.
13 Ibid.
14 See also Joined cases C 141/12 and C 372/12, YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Inte- gratie en Asiel
and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M (Hereinafter “YS”), 17.07.2014, par. 44.
15 Chapter III GDPR and Directive 2016/680.
16 Art 10 and 11 Directive 95/46/EC, Articles 13 and 14 GDPR, Article 13 Directive 2016/680.
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allows the data subject to inquire at any time the controller about the current and past
stand of the processing of his data, i.e. the right of access a fortiori refers also to the
past [17].17
Third, the right of access allows the supervision of the legality of the processing not
only until the moment of the !rst access request. It further allows the data subject to
monitor whether a certain illegality has been effectively redressed and when. A
case in point is the ECtHR case of Khelili. The Geneva police had found business cards
in the possession of the applicant, Khelili, whose content could suggest that she was a
prostitute. Thus, she was entered in the police system as a “prostitute.” She objected,
claiming she was not a prostitute. She demanded the police to change her profession to
“tailor.” The police acknowledged that since they could not !nd evidence that the
applicant was indeed a prostitute, the profession should be corrected. After subse-
quently requesting from the Geneva police information about her !le several times, the
applicant learned from police of!cials that “prostitute” seemed to have been corrected
in the police information system, but not in the criminal record of the applicant, who
had been later detained and sentenced on probation for small crimes. Khelili shows the
importance of having a framework for (directly) accessing one’s data in all !les held by
the police in order to detect illegalities and ensure their timely recti!cation. This is
especially important in the police sector due to the potential consequences on the data
subjects [14].18
Advocate General Kokott reminds in the Nowak case which concerns access to
exam scripts, however, that exercising the rights of recti!cation, erasure or blocking is
not the sole aim of the right of access. Rather data subjects in principle have a “le-
gitimate interest in !nding out what information about them is processed by the con-
troller,” when at all information is processed, i.e. it refers more broadly to transparency
[20].19 This con!rms the plurality of the role of the right of access in protecting our
private lives and right to data protection.
Fourth, the disclosure of different illegalities related to the processing of one’s data
could have a wider impact, i.e. trigger political, judicial and policy-making action
by raising awareness about the processing operations which affect the public at large.
An example is the case of Max Schrems’s access to his Facebook data which lead to
more Facebook users claiming access to their data and to judicial proceedings and
legislative changes such as striking down the Safe Harbour and replacing it with the
Privacy Shield [18].
17 CJEU, C-533/07, Rijkeboer, par. 54.
18 ECtHR, Khelili v Switzerland, Application no. 16188/07, 18 October 2011. The Court held in
favour of the applicant, because “prostitute” was not deleted for a long time, the Swiss authorities
gave contradictory statements as to whether the term “prostitute” was deleted, the police could not
prove the accuracy of the data and that it had been recti!ed/deleted (a requirement under Swiss law),
par. 68–71.
19 CJEU, C-434/16, Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner, Opinion of Advocate General
Kokott, 20.07.2017, par. 38–39. The case concerns the request for access to one’s exam scripts and
the comments made by the examiners. The main question was whether exam scripts qualify as
personal data.
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4 Scope of the Right of Access in Directive 2016/680
The right of access is enshrined in Article 14 Directive 2016/680. Briefly said, it grants
data subjects the right to be informed whether a controller processes data concerning
them and receive certain details about the data and the data processing operations.
Articles 12 and 17 regulate the modalities of the exercise, while Articles 15 regulates
the limitations to the right, i.e. the cases in which the controller may restrict the right,
the conditions that need to be ful!lled and the procedures which need to be followed in
that case.
The right of access is to be exercised by the data subject against the controller.
Only of!cials working in the !eld of law-enforcement when they carry out law-
enforcement tasks on behalf of the competent EU Member State authorities may
qualify as controllers under Directive 2016/680.20 This means that theoretically if a
data subject evokes his right of access against a controller from the private sector, e.g.
Facebook Ireland, to check whether it disclosed his data such as exchange of messages
to the Irish police authority, then the data subjects may not evoke Article 14 Directive
2016/680 against Facebook Ireland. In that scenario Facebook Ireland would still be
acting within the scope of the GDPR since it is not a law enforcement authority itself
[21], whereas the actions of the Irish police would fall within Directive 2016/680.
Further, Directive 2016/680 does not apply to EU institutions, agencies and bodies
which process personal data for law-enforcement purposes, e.g. EUROPOL,21 or to
processing which does not fall within the scope of EU law.22
5 The Controller Has to Provide Six Categories
of Information to the Data Subject
When the data subject evokes the right of access under Directive 2016/680 and the
controller decides to grant him that right, the controller shall !rst con!rm to the data
subject whether he is processing personal data concerning the data subject. If this is the
case, he should further grant him access to the said data and communicate to the
data subject six categories of information concerning the data processing.23 By
contrast, under Article 17 (1) (a) 2008 Framework Decision the data subject was
entitled only to three categories (Table 1).24
20 Article 2 (1) Directive 2016/680.
21 Article 2 (3) (b) Directive 2016/680.
22 Article 2 (3) (a) Directive 2016/680.
23 Article 14 Directive 2016/680.
24 Article 17 (1) (a) 2008 Framework Decision.
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Thus, one sees that the information concerning the processing which the controller
needs to provide under Directive 2016/680 is broader than the details to which the data
subject was entitled under the 2008 Framework Decision.
Below is a detailed discussion of the information to be provided to data subjects
under Directive 2016/680.
5.1 The Purposes of and Legal Basis for the Processing (Art. 14 (a))
The provision of this information is essential for the data subject who needs to
understand clearly why his data is being processed and most importantly - whether it
has a legal basis. On that point Directive 2016/680 goes one step further from Article
15 GDPR which does not require the provision of information on the legal basis. The
addition of this requirement in Directive 2016/680 could be due to the fact that
Directive 2016/680, unlike the GDPR, does not contain a list of grounds for legitimacy
of data processing, e.g. consent or contractual obligations.25 Article 8 Directive
2016/680 only requires the data processing be based on Union or Member State law
Table 1. Comparison between the 2008 Framework Decision and Directive 2016/680
Information to the data subject under





Confirmation that data are being pro- 




Legal basis for the processing
я
я
Categories of personal data я
(Categories of) recipients я я
Envisaged storage period/criteria for the
storage
я
Rights to rectification, erasure or re- 
striction of processing
я
Right to lodge a complaint with the su-
pervisory authority
+




Personal data undergoing processing
+
Information about the origin of the data
я я
я
Confirmation that data have been
transmitted/disclosed
я
25 Article 6 GDPR.
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and that it be necessary for the performance of a task related to the prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal
penalties, carried out by the competent authority.26 Thus, pointing to the speci!c law
underlying the processing is an indispensable piece of information for the monitoring
of the legality of the processing.
The legal basis of the processing is not the same as the purpose of the processing,
although the legal basis must specify the objective and purposes of the processing as
well as the personal data to be processed.27 Communicating the purposes of the pro-
cessing in addition to the legal basis enables the examination of whether the purpose is
legitimate and whether the other principles, namely data accuracy, minimization and
storage, are complied with, as they are tested against the purpose. On that note, one
should not forget that the original controller himself or another controller may con-
ditionally process the data for another purpose, different from the one for which the
data were collected.28 This implies that also the change of purpose of and legal basis
for the processing by the controller contacted should be communicated to the data
subject. This is important, since change of purpose does not have to be communicated
to the data subject under the controller’s information obligations.29 Thus, the only way
for a data subject to stay aware of the (new) purposes of the processing of his data is by
exercising his right of access “at reasonable intervals.”30
However, the wording of Article 14 Directive 2016/680 suggests that the controller
is obliged to communicate information only about the processing he is engaged in, not
processing of the same data which is carried out by other controllers, e.g. for a different
purpose. Thus, to have a clear overview of the full cycle of the processing of his data
and the legality thereof, the data subject might need to !le separate requests to the
different controllers, of which he may gain knowledge through the information on the
recipients of the data (see point 3 below).
5.2 The Categories of Personal Data, the Personal Data Which Is
Processed and the Origin of the Data (Art.14 (b) and (g))
The essence of this provision is to allow the data subject to have an overview of the
personal information which the controller processes, verify and possibly contest its
accuracy and monitor other aspects of legality of the of the data, e.g. data minimization,
and exercise his rights as a data subject.31 While the GDPR grants data subjects the
right to obtain a copy of their data,32 this is not explicitly granted in Article 14
Directive 2016/680. Pursuant to the wording of Article 14 Directive 2016/680 and
26 Article 8 (1) Directive 2016/680 j Article 1 (1) Directive 2016/680 (emphasis added).
27 Article 8 (2) Directive 2016/680.
28 Article 4 (2) Directive 2016/680. The provision is similar to the requirements in Article 8.
29 Article 13 Directive 2016/680. See by contrast Article 13 (3) GDPR.
30 Recital 43 Directive 2016/680. Note that the possibility to exercise the right “at reasonable
intervals” is not mentioned in the text of Article 14 itself.
31 Recital 43 Directive 2016/680.
32 Article 15 (3) GDPR.
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Recital 43 Directive 2016/680 it seems suf!cient that the controller provide a “full
summary … in an intelligible form” listing each piece of personal data. The summary
could be provided also in the form of a copy of the data which are processed (see
footnote 31). As the CJEU argued in the YS case, the form in which the personal data
are provided to the data subject is immaterial as long as the data is presented in such a
way as to allow the data subject to understand which personal data of his are being
processed and monitor the legality of their processing.33
Where the data controller possesses information about the origin of the data, e.g.
another law enforcement authority, this information could be precious to the data
subject since it would reveal the details about the information held on them by other
controllers. However, if the data originated from natural persons, their identity should
not be disclosed, in particular if the sources are to remain con!dential (see footnote 31).
This could be attributed to the fact that the right of access should not cause harms to
others, e.g. vulnerable witnesses. It is not surprising that the right of access may be
restricted in order to “protect the rights and freedoms of others.”34 In addition, as
Advocate General Sharpston argued in her YS Opinion, the right of access to one’s
personal data does not cover the right of access to the personal data of others.35
5.3 Recipients or Categories of Recipients, Especially in Third Countries
(Art. 14 (c))
If the data controller further discloses the personal data to recipients, then he should
include this in the response to the access request. This allows the data subject to control
whether his data was treated with due con!dentiality [22]. However, there are two
caveats about this provision. In the !rst place, the controller may restrict the infor-
mation only to “categories of recipients,” thus not providing a full list of recipients. The
article does not provide further guidance as to when the controller may choose to
provide only the categories of recipients, e.g. does it depend on the effort involved in
providing the complete information, or a conflict with a con!dentiality requirement,
etc.
In the second place, Directive 2016/680 excludes from the de!nition of recipients
those public authorities which receive data in the framework of a particular inquiry in
the general interest in accordance with Union or Member State law, e.g. tax and
customs authorities.36 This exception is quite broad and it is not clear why information
33 Joined cases C 141/12 and C 372/12, YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and
Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M (Hereinafter “YS”), 17.07.2014, par. 57–58. See
also Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion of 12.12.2013, par. 77–78. The case concerned the
application of Third Country Nationals to review the legal reasoning of the Dutch authorities’
decision on their application for residence permits. The Court ruled that the analysis or the minutes
are not personal data and do not fall within the scope of the right of access under Directive 95/46/EC
and thus disclosing the whole legal analysis, i.e. providing a copy thereof, was not necessary,
whereas a summary only of the personal data contained in the applicants’ !les was enough.
34 Article 15 (1) (e) Directive 2016/680.
35 Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion of 12.12.2013, par. 77, op. cit.
36 Article 3 (10) and Recital 22 Directive 2016/680.
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on the transmission of the data to any of these authorities shall be excluded from the
information to be provided to the data subject.
Shortly put, Article 14 (c) Directive 2016/680 unfortunately does not oblige the
data controller to provide complete information as to who has received the data of the
data subject.
5.4 Envisaged Storage Period (Article 14 (d))
The controller should inform the data subject of the envisaged storage period. If this is
not possible, the controller should at least indicate the criteria according to which the
storage period will be determined. However, one should be aware that the purpose(s) of
the processing might change. If at the time of the access request the future change of
purpose is already certain and it is known that it would lead to a longer storage period,
then for the sake of transparency the controller had better communicate the exact
storage period or the criteria for determining it. However, if this is not the case but the
purpose changes later, the data subject might not be aware of the new storage period
and as explained above, the data controller is not obliged to inform the data subject of
the purpose change.
5.5 Existence of Other Rights (Article 14 (e))
The controller should clearly indicate to the data subject that he may request the
recti!cation, erasure or restriction of processing of his data. Such requests could follow
after the data subject has examined the data undergoing processing and detected
irregularities, e.g. the data is incorrect (such as wrong spelling of his name) or that data
not concerning the applicant are wrongly attributed to him and have to be deleted.
Directive 2016/680, unlike the GDPR, does not grant data subjects the right to
object to the processing of their data and it is questioned why data subjects are deprived
of this right. Thus, also the data controller cannot inform the data subject of his non-
existing right to object.
Another missing point is the obligation of the controller to disclose the existence of
automated decision-making such as pro!ling, the algorithmic logic of the processing
and the potential consequences for the data subject.37 Nowadays the law-enforcement
authorities are using more and more pro!ling techniques which could impact data
subjects, even if this software does not itself take the !nal decision, e.g. PNR pro!ling
which assesses the risk of each passenger.38 While disclosing the exact logic of the
algorithms might sometimes endanger the work of the law-enforcement authorities, it is
not clear why the data subject may not be made aware of the mere existence of such
automated decision-making. This might be needed in cases when even if the data is
correct, the software might still wrongly process the data, e.g. a technical failure in the
matching of biometric data when someone’s !ngerprints are matched against the
37 Compare Article 15 (1) (h) GDPR.
38 Article 6 EU PNR Directive.
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database of available !ngerprints, e.g. of convicts. Not being aware of such automated
decisions could prevent the data subject from challenging the conclusions.
5.6 Lodging a Complaint with the Supervisory Authority (Article 14 (f))
This provision concerns the general right of data subjects to submit a complaint to the
supervisory authority of their choice when they consider that the processing of their
data infringes the provisions of Directive 2016/680.39 Thus, the purpose of the pro-
vision is to inform the data subject of that right and provide them with the contact
details of the supervisory authority, i.e. to facilitate the exercise of that right. This is
compatible with the obligation of the controller in Article 17 (2) to inform the data
subject that, in case the controller refuses to grant him access to his data, the data
subject may exercise his right of access indirectly, via the supervisory authority.
6 The Right of Access Is Not Absolute
As already indicated above, the data subject’s right of access to his data is not absolute.
The data controller may wholly or partially restrict it if four conditions are met. First,
the limitation must be based on a legislative measure adopted by the Member States.
Second, the restriction may apply only for as long as it constitutes a necessary and
proportionate measure. Third, due respect has to be taken of the fundamental rights and
legitimate interests of the data subject.40 In that regard, any limitation should be
compatible with the CFREU and the ECHR.41
Fourth, the restriction should pursue at least one of the legitimate purposes pro-
vided in Article 15 (1) Directive 2016/680, namely:
(a) avoid obstructing of!cial or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures;
(b) avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of crim-
inal offences or the execution of criminal penalties;
(c) protect public security; (d) national security; (e) the rights and freedoms of others.
However, as the AG in the YS case noted, the rights and freedoms of others do “not
encompass the rights and freedoms of the authority processing personal data.”42
These grounds for exemption are the same as the ones that applied under the 2008
Framework Decision [23].43 Further, the Member States may adopt legislative
39 Article 52 Directive 2016/680.
40 Article 15 (1) Directive 2016/680.
41 Recital 46 Directive 2016/680 and CJEU, C-465/00, 138/01, 139/01 Öster- reichischer Rundfunk,
20.05.2003. In that case the CJEU ruled that if a limitation on the data protection rights of
individuals is not compatible with the fundamental rights, e.g. to privacy as enshrined in the ECHR
and by extension nowadays in the CFREU, then the limitations cannot be deemed to be compatible
with provisions of secondary law, e.g. Directive 2016/680.
42 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in the YS case, op. cit., par. 93 (4).
43 Art. 17 (2) 2008 Framework Decision.
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measures about the categories of processing which may be subject to exemption.44 The
grounds are phrased quite broadly and thus the controller would have a wide margin of
appreciation making use of these exceptions. As some have noted, the restrictions on
the right of access might end up easily curtailing the effectiveness of the right of access
of the concerned individuals [24].
It is still to be seen how broadly the Member States would phrase the exemptions
when implementing Directive 2016/680. For example, the German implementing law
requires that when the recipients of the data are intelligence, military counter intelli-
gence, constitutional protection authorities and other authorities involved in national
security, then information about these recipients could be given to the data subject only
if the concerned recipient gives its agreement [25].45 This restriction is beyond the
control of the data controller and leaves the recipients a wide margin of appreciation.
Further, the German legislator allows the controller to restrict the right of access
also when data are stored only due to legal requirements or they are used only for
purposes of data security or data protection audits, when granting the right of access
would pose disproportionate effort and all measures have been taken to prevent their
processing for other purposes.46 The right of access could be denied also if the data
subject does not provide enough information which allows the controller to !nd his
personal data without disproportionate effort.47 Thus, new grounds for denial of access
have been added by the German legislator. It is questionable whether they are in line
with Directive 2016/680.
If the controller restricts wholly or partly the right of access of a certain data
subject, he should inform the data subject of the complete refusal or the restriction of
access, including the reasons for the decision. This information is to be communicated
to the data subject “in writing” and “without undue delay.” If disclosing such infor-
mation would undermine one of the legitimate grounds for the restriction, then the
controller may omit it. However, he has to inform the data subject of his right to lodge a
complaint with a supervisory authority and to seek a judicial remedy.48 While it is clear
that the controller has to inform the data subject about the refusal to grant access in
whole, the wording of the provision does not make it clear whether in case of a partial
refusal the controller may inform the data subject at least about which part of his
request has been refused or he should omit both this information and the reasons for the
partial refusal. Reading this provision in light of the purpose of the right of access, as a
matter of principle the controller should inform the data subject also if he partially
restricts the right of access.
In any case, it is positive that the controller is to be accountable about his decision
by documenting the factual or legal reasons for the refusal and making them available
to the supervisory authorities.49
44 Article 15 (2) Directive 2016/680.
45 § 57 (5) German implementing law.
46 Ibid, § 57 (2).
47 Ibid, § 57 (3).
48 Article 15 (3) Directive 2016/680.
49 Article 15 (4) Directive 2016/680.
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7 Directive 2016/680 Imposes Procedural Requirements
The controller, the supervisory authorities, as well as data subjects will have to follow
the procedures established by Directive 2016/680, as discussed in the present Section.
7.1 Direct Access Becomes the Rule, Indirect - The Exception
Article 14 Directive 2016/680 is phrased in a way which suggests that the data subject
may in all cases directly contact the data controller to request access to his own data
[26]. The bene!t of this direct contact is evident from the Khelili case discussed in
Sect. 3. However, in the cases in which the controller decides not to grant him full or
any access to his data, then the data subject may turn to the competent supervisory
authority.50 It is the controller who should make the data subject aware of this pos-
sibility.51 When the data subject turns to the supervisory authority, the latter should
carry out the necessary checks, e.g. check which data concerning the data subject are
processed, whether the processing is lawful, whether the data are correct, etc. The
supervisory authority should inform the data subject “at least” that the necessary
veri!cations and/or review have been carried out and that the data subject may apply
for a judicial remedy.52 This means that further information may also be provided.
Whether and which additional information may be further provided should be assessed
on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the principles of proportionality and
necessity. For example, an innocent person’s name might be entered in a police
database because of a spelling mistake. When the supervisory authority establishes and
corrects this mistake, it seems unproblematic to communicate to the data subject the
fact that there was a spelling mistake which was corrected. In that scenario the data
subject still exercises his right of access, but only indirectly. Similarly, the ECtHR
reached several times the conclusion that if direct access cannot be granted to the data
subject, due to the need to balance different interests, then at least the decision of the
controller should be reviewed by an independent authority.53
However, it is questionable whether indirect access ful!lls the main purposes of the
right of access, e.g. whether the supervisory authority is always in a position to detect
irregularities, ensure they are recti!ed and if not, then the question arises how a data
subject can pursue his case in court if he does not have access to his data and might not
know whether the supervisory authority recti!ed the illegalities. Another problem is
that the information which the supervisory authority may disclose will have to be
“approved” by the law enforcement and possibly other authorities. This challenges the
requirement that supervisory authorities be independent.54 As the EDPS noted with
regards to the Proposal for a EUROJUST Regulation, for an independent supervisory
50 Article 17 (1) Directive 2016/680; also §57 (7) and §59 German Implementing Law.
51 Article 17 (2) Directive 2016/680.
52 Article 17 (3) Directive 2016/680.
53 ECtHR, Amann and Gaskin, op. cit.
54 Article 42 Directive 2016/680.
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authority which is subject to court oversight, the decision should be taken indepen-
dently, after consultation with the controller [36].
Granting data subjects the right of direct access, unless a restriction applies, rep-
resents a departure from current practice. For example, the right of access under the
2008 Framework Decision, SIS II and VIS may be exercised through the national
supervisory authority which may decide what and how information is to be commu-
nicated to the data subject.55 Other instruments, e.g. the EU PNR Directive and
EURODAC Regulation simply refer the 2008 Framework Decision for the exercise of
data subjects’ rights, i.e. they allow for indirect access.56 Now certain Member States
might need to align their procedures with Directive 2016/680. As a result, access under
the other instruments might also become direct, which might harmonize the access
procedures under the different instruments. However, it is yet to be seen whether the
procedures will be amended and whether instruments such as SIS II and VIS will be
amended accordingly.
7.2 The Controller Should Communicate with the Data Subject
Intelligibly and in a Timely Fashion
The controller should communicate in “clear and plain language,” using “concise,
intelligible and easily accessible form.”57 This is supposed to help data subjects
actually comprehend the data processing and how they are affected by it. The controller
should also facilitate the exercise of the rights, e.g. of access, and provide it free of
charge if the request is not excessive or manifestly ill-founded. Otherwise he could
charge a fee or even refuse the request, bearing the responsibility for proving that the
request was excessive or ill-founded.58
Pursuant to Article 12 (5), the data controller may take measures to make sure that
the applicant is the concerned data subject in case he has doubts about his identity.
Articles 12 and 14 Directive 2016/680 do not impose hard limits on the data
controller to respond to a request by the data subject, unlike some AFSJ instruments.59
He only has to inform the data subject of the follow-up to his request “without undue
delay.”60 For example, in the case of Haralambie the ECtHR ruled that granting access
to the requested data only six years after the request was submitted was not compatible
with Article 8 ECHR [27].61 Similarly, in the Yonchev case the ECtHR held that the
55 Article 58 (1) and (2) Council Decision SIS II; 14 (1) and (2) VIS Council Decision; Article 17
(1) (a) 2008 Framework Decision.
56 Article 13 (1) EU PNR Directive and 33 (1) EURODAC Regulation.
57 Article 12 (1) Directive 2016/680.
58 Article 12 (2) and (4) Directive 2016/680.
59 E.g. Article 14 (6) VIS Council Decision and Article 58 (6) Council Decision SIS II. How are they
different.
60 Article 12 (3) Directive 2016/680.
61 ECtHR, Haralambie v Romania, application no. 21737/03, 27.10.2009. The applicant wanted to
know whether the security services had a !le on him from the time during the Communist regime.
A !le indeed existed, but the applicant was allowed to see it only 6 years after he !led the request.
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fact that the applicant was refused with !nality access to his !le only 5 years after the
application for access was unduly long [28].62
8 Challenges Still Remain
The right of access under Directive 2016/680 is already a step forward towards more
law enforcement accountability and transparency. Nevertheless, one should take into
account the broader picture of law-enforcement use of personal data in the EU,
including in the framework of EUROPOL, EUROJUST, SIS II, VIS and EURODAC,
where different procedures on the right of access apply. This causes frictions, which
take away from the effectiveness of the right of access.
8.1 Data Protection in the Law-Enforcement Sector in the EU Remains
Fragmented
The !rst problem is the variety of law enforcement authorities processing personal data,
the different information systems they operate with and thus the applicability of several
legal instruments on data protection. Which authorities – national and European -
process the personal data of a speci!c individual might not be known to the concerned
data subject.
For example, a national authority may disclose the data which it holds on a data
subject on one or several national information systems upon his request under Directive
2016/680. It is not clear whether the contacted authority also has an obligation to
disclose information about data stored on the data subject on the EU-wide SIS II or
whether the data subject has to !le a separate request for access under the SIS II
Council Decision. This is likely to depend on whether the contacted national authority
is also a controller for SIS II or whether one will interpret the notion of “controller”
broadly to mean that, e.g. any police authority if contacted has to provide access
concerning all !les held by the different police authorities in the particular Member
State. Still in the case of SIS II, the decision on disclosure of SIS II data would be
influenced by the Member State which entered the alert if the alert was not entered by
the authority to which the data subject !led his request.63 In case of denial of access in
such cross-border cases effective cooperation between national supervisory authorities
will be needed. It is also not clear whether in deciding if a restriction on the right of
access applies in the case of SIS II only the grounds for exemption in Article 58
(4) Council Decision SIS II apply or also the ones in Article 15 Directive 2016/680.
EUROPOL and EUROJUST add another level of complexity. As EU agencies,
they fall outside the scope of Directive 2016/680. Thus, if a national authority has
62 ECtHR, Yonchev v. Bulgaria, application no. 12504/09, 7.12.2017, par. 61. The applicant requested
access to the results of his psychological assessment as an applicant for a police mission abroad. It
was refused on grounds of con!dentiality. It turned out that the documents were not con!dential, the
decision was taken by a body which was not entitled to take such decisions and the procedure had
taken too long.
63 Article 58 (3) Council Decision SIS II.
The Right of Access Under the Police Directive 125
forwarded data to EUROPOL, it is assumed that it will notify the data subject of this
disclosure, pursuant to Article 14 (c) Directive 2016/680. However, EUROPOL might
hold further data on the same data subject, obtained from other sources. To obtain
access to all the data held on him by EUROPOL the data subject has to trigger the
procedure prescribed by the EUROPOL Regulation, which provides for indirect access
only via the national authority of the respective Member State, following a lengthy and
complex procedure [29].64
Last but not least, the Commission has been promoting the concept of interoper-
ability between the different AFSJ databases. This could lead to, amongst others,
quicker and easier law enforcement access to data, e.g. on VIS and EURODAC, as well
as new databases, e.g. the Multiple Identity Detector (MID) and the Common Identity
Repository (CIR) [30, 31].65
The two interoperability proposals refer to the data subjects’ rights as enshrined in
the GDPR and Regulation 45/2001 on data protection by the EU institutions, bodies
and agencies [32].66 No references are made to Directive 2016/680.67 This is peculiar
since, for example, a law-enforcement authority such as SIRENE in the framework of
SIS II, which could fall under Directive 2016/680, could qualify as a data controller in
the context of MID.68 However, for the de!nition of controllers the proposals refer only
to the GDPR, although the processing of data in SIS II in the law enforcement context
is subject to Directive 2016/680 [33].69 It is not clear whether excluding the application
of Directive 2016/680 is a mistake or not. The result is that if the proposal is not
modi!ed accordingly, then interoperability will lead to additional fragmentation and
complication in the exercise of the right of access.
8.2 The Blurred Lines Between Law Enforcement and National Security
Challenge the National Security Exemption in Directive 2016/680
Another problem are the blurred lines between law enforcement and national security
authorities. The latter do not fall within the scope of Directive 2016/680.70 For
example, the PNR Directive, whose purpose is the !ght against terrorism and serious
crime,71 poses challenges. The reason is that the PNR Directive leaves freedom to each
Member State to establish or designate the authority which is responsible for !ghting
terrorism and serious crime and which will process PNR data, called Passenger
Information Unit (PIU).72 In some Member States the PIU is part of the national
64 Article 36 EUROPOL Regulation.
65 EU Interoperability Proposal 1 and 2, 2017.
66 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.
67 Article 47 Proposals COM (2017) 794 !nal, Brussels 12.12.2017 and COM (2017) 793 !nal,
12.12.2017 op. cit.
68 Article 29 (2) COM (2017) 794 !nal, Brussels, 12.12.2017, op. cit.
69 See also Article 64 SIS II Proposal 2016.
70 Recital 14 Directive 2016/680.
71 Article 1 (2) EU PNR Directive.
72 Article 4 (1) EU PNR Directive.
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security agency [34, 35]. Normally national security falls outside the scope of Union
law and by extension Directive 2016/680.73 However, Directive 2016/680 and the
procedures on the right of access in it are applicable to the PNR. Thus, when PIUs
handle access requests, they have to follow the procedure established in Articles 12, 14,
15 and 17 Directive 2016/680.74 The increasing role that security/intelligence
authorities play in law-enforcement matters demonstrates that the separation between
them in terms of the applicability of Directive 2016/680 is dif!cult to explain and may
be detrimental for the consistent enforcement of the right of data subjects.
9 Conclusion
The discussion above demonstrates that the right of access to one’s data under
Directive 2016/680 is expected to improve the transparency and accountability of the
law-enforcement sector and to trigger amendments to the currently existing procedures
on right of access under the AFSJ instruments in force. In how far the new procedures
for its exercise will be harmonized on national level and how broadly the exemptions of
the right of access will be framed is still to be seen after the Member States adopt the
necessary implementing laws. However, as the discussion evidenced, de!ciencies can
already be identi!ed in terms of the transparency it seeks to ensure and consistency
across the law enforcement authorities’ data protection obligation on EU and Member
State level. The problems can be summarized as follows:
1. The right does not include essential information such as on pro!ling measures and
the recipients of the data;
2. The fact that the right is to be exercised against controller in a world of many
interconnected controllers might make it dif!cult for the data subject to obtain a
thorough overview of his data;
3. The different controllers are subject to different legal frameworks and procedures
which causes fragmentation.
An ideal solution would be the harmonization of the substantive and procedural
provisions on the right of access in all instruments. However, the fragmentation reflects
the evolution of Member State police cooperation and EUROPOL as special areas,
which might make harmonization politically challenging.
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Abstract. Legislative compliance assessment tools are commonly used by
companies to help them to understand their legal obligations. One of the primary
limitations of existing tools is that they tend to consider each regulation in
isolation. In this paper, we propose a flexible and modular compliance assess-
ment framework that can support multiple legislations. Additionally, we
describe our extension of the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) so that it
can be used not only to represent digital rights but also legislative obligations,
and discuss how the proposed model is used to develop a flexible compliance
system, where changes to the obligations are automatically reflected in the
compliance assessment tool. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed approach through the development of a General Data Protection
Regulatory model and compliance assessment tool.
Keywords: Compliance ! GDPR ! ODRL
1 Introduction
The interpretation of legal texts can be challenging, especially for people with non-
legal backgrounds, as they often contain domain-speci!c de!nitions, cross-references
and ambiguities [29]. Also, generally speaking legislations cannot be considered in
isolation, for instance European Union (EU) regulations often contain opening clauses
that permit Member States to introduce more restrictive local legislation. Additionally,
depending on the legislative domain additional legislations may also need to be con-
sulted. For example, when it comes to data protection in the EU, in addition to the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4], the upcoming e-privacy regulation
(for e-communication sector) [5] or the Payment services (PSD 2) directive (for pay-
ments sector) [3] may also need to be consulted. As such, ensuring compliance with
regulations can be a daunting task for many companies, who could potentially face
hefty !nes and reputation damage if not done properly. Consequently, companies often
rely on legislative compliance assessment tools to provide guidance with respect to
their legal obligations [8].
Over the years, several theoretical frameworks that support the modelling of leg-
islation have been proposed [7, 10, 14, 22, 23, 25, 32], however only some of which
were validated via the development of legal support systems [7, 10, 23, 25, 32]. One of
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
M. Medina et al. (Eds.): APF 2018, LNCS 11079, pp. 131–149, 2018.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02547-2_8
the major drawbacks of such approaches is the fact that some do not consider concepts
like soft-obligations (i.e. obligations that serve as recommendations rather than being
mandatory) [22, 25] or exceptions (i.e. scenarios where the obligations are not appli-
cable) [10, 29]. Additionally generally speaking the models are only loosely coupled
with the actual legislation text, making it dif!cult to verify the effectiveness of such
systems. More recently, a number of compliance assessment tools have been developed
[18, 26, 28]. However, these systems are either composed of a handful of questions that
are used to evaluate legal obligations [18] or do not !lter out questions that are not
applicable for the company completing the assessment [26, 28]. One of the primary
drawbacks of existing compliance assessment tools is the fact that they do not currently
consider related regulations.
In order to address this gap, we propose a generic legislative compliance assess-
ment framework, that has been designed to support multiple legislations. Additionally,
we extend the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) [34] (which is primarily used for
rights expression) so that it can be used to express legislative obligations. Both of
which are necessary !rst steps towards a context dependent compliance system that can
easily be adapted for different regulatory domains.
The contributions of the paper are as follows: (i) we devise a flexible and modular
compliance assessment framework, which is designed to support multiple legislations;
(ii) we propose a legislative ODRL pro!le that can be used to model obligations
speci!ed in different legislations; and (iii) we develop a dynamic compliance system
that can easily be adapted to work with different legislations. The proposed framework
is instantiated in the form of a GDPR compliance assessment tool, which is subse-
quently compared with alternative approaches.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents different
approaches that can be used to model data protection legislations, along with com-
pliance assessment tools for the GDPR. Section 3 details our framework that decouples
the legislative obligations from the compliance assessment tool. Section 4 introduces
our legislative model and illustrates how it can be used to model the GDPR. Section 5
describes the compliance tool. In Sect. 6 we compare and contrast our proposal with
alternative solutions. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes the paper and presents directions for
future work.
2 Related Work
Although the modelling of legal text has been a !eld of study for many years, in this
section we discuss those that focus on the modelling of data protection related legis-
lations, and present three different tools that have been developed to help companies to
comply with the GDPR.
Barth et al. [7] present a theoretical model for the representation of privacy
expectations that is based on a contextual integrity framework [27]. The approach is
validated via the modelling of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
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